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ADVANCING THE CRA-USING THE CRA'S
STRATEGIC PLAN OPTION TO PROMOTE
COMMUNITY INCLUSION: THE CRA
AND COMMUNITY INCLUSION
CASSANDRA JONES HAVARD*

INTRODUCTION

Banks, banking regulators, and community organizations have
spent nearly thirty years interpreting and re-interpreting the simple
but ambiguous mandate of the Community Reinvestment Act
(CRA). The statute imposes an affirmative duty requiring "regu
lated financial institutions [to] have continuing ... obligation[s] to
help meet the ~redit needs of the local communities in which they
are chartered."l The CRA was met with much resistance and lax
enforcement for almost a decade. Active protest from community
groups,2 a more defined CRA exam,3 and innovative, profitable
lending strategies,4 have resulted in a dramatic increase in commu
nity reinvestment dollar commitments and in loans to low- and
* B.A., Bennett College; J.D., University of Pennsylvania School of Law; Asso
ciate Professor of Law, University of Baltimore School of Law. I am grateful to West
ern New England College School of Law, Eric Gouvin, Associate Dean for Academic
Affairs and Professor of Law at the Western New England College School of Law, for
the invitation to participate in the symposium, and for the assistance of Margaret Solis
and the Western New Eng/and Law Review.
1. Community Reinvestment Act, Congressional Findings and Statement of Pur
pose, 12 U.S.c. § 2901(a)(3) (2000).
2. Marion A. Cowell, Jr. & Monty D. Hagler, The Community Reinvestment Act
in the Decade of Bank Consolidation, 27 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 83, 88 (1992) (explain
ing how community groups were able to halt a bank's proposed expansion by showing
poor CRA performance).
3. When Congress amended the CRA, the four banking agencies issued joint reg
ulations for the first time. E.L. Baldinucci, The Community Reinvestment Act: New
Standards Provide New Hope, 23 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 831, 847-52 (1996) (comparing
the revised CRA tests measuring a bank's lending, investment, and service with the
former twelve factors used to evaluate CRA lending).
4. Andrew Jacobson, The Burden of Good Intentions: Intermediate-Sized Banks
and Thrifts and the Community Reinvestment Act, 6 U.c. DAVIS Bus. L.J. 119, 135-36
(2006) (discussing a 2000 Federal Reserve study on the performance and profitability of
CRA-related lending, reporting that 84 percent of CRA lending is profitable).
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moderate-income (LMI) and minority households. 5
Banks have accepted reinvestment as a means of meeting the
convenience and credit needs of communities and preventing urban
deterioration. Yet, implementation and enforcement of the eRA
remain problematic. The increase in lending has created another
trouble-less vigorous and less qualitative enforcement. In an era
of potentially lessened accountability due to almost laissez-faire en
forcement, the eRA can benefit from increased use of regulatory
enforcement powers and from more standardized performance
reports.
The eRA is designed to make lending institutions more ac
countable to the communities they affect. By definition, accounta
bility requires banks to have some input from constituent
communities. Measuring the eRA's efficacy according to out
come-that is, the real improvement of physical infrastructures,
maintenance of social and economic stability, and the actual influx
of credit and investment capital into communities-is desirable.
The dilemma presented when balancing community participa
tion and inclusiveness while preserving as much autonomy as possi
ble for financial institutions is the subject of this article. Part I
discusses the eRA's explicit and implicit objectives. Part II dis
cusses the eRA's evaluative tools: the traditional three-part test
and the strategic eRA plan. The three-part test measures a bank's
actual performance in service, investment, and lending. As an op
tional way to comply with the eRA, the strategic eRA plan envi
sions that lenders will seek community input in setting five-year
eRA objectives. 6 The strategic plan brings to the forefront the con
flict and pressure that banks experience when community groups
organize to halt an institution's merger or expansion plans based on
past eRA performance. Part III discusses the potential pitfalls that
can be produced by the eRA's obligations. Such obligations, if not
carefully crafted, could limit the flow of capital into communities
even from banks that are willing to reinvest. Efforts to increase
capital must be paired with sensitivity to a community'S redevelop
ment concerns. Vocal communities that are able to determine their
sustainable economic need must have the opportunity to participate
meaningfully in the funding process. The conflict between allowing
communities to participate in shaping the bank's funding commit
5. Michael S. Barr, Credit Where It Counts: The Community Reinvestment Act and
its Critics, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 513,569-73 (2005).
6. See infra Part II.B.
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ments and requiring a bank to pledge its financial support in ad
vance is discussed in Part III. Part IV discusses the definition and
role of community participation and outlines various ways that
communities can be better included in a bank's reinvestment pro
cess. The section concludes with a suggestion of factors to use in
evaluating the level of community participation and inclusiveness.
Part V discusses the importance of the strategic plan option to com
munity participation.
I.

THE CRA's COMPLEMENTARY OBJECTIVES

The CRA's basic premise of making access to credit available
across all neighborhoods is as relevant today as it was when the
statute was passed. The CRA has evolved to have several comple
mentary objectives: prohibiting redlining, halting community disin
vestment, and protecting LMI borrowers.
When Congress enacted the [CRA] in 1977 .... [t]he act easily
could have been hailed as fundamental civil rights and business
opportunity legislation, as the Act encouraged the fair treatment
of potential borrowers regardless of race, ethnicity or geographi
cal location. The CRA also expanded opportunities for the fi
nancial industry by establishing lending criteria that opened the
door to a significantly greater credit market. [CRA lending pol
icy is specifically aimed at] overcoming [the ingrained] financial
policies within the banking and lending industry that limited ac
cess to credit and thereby wealth, based often on the race or
ethnicity of the borrower or borrower['s] community.?

Similarly, the CRA complements national policies designed to
revitalize severely economically depressed communities. Access to
affordable credit is also a consequence of community reinvestment
lending and arguably an implicit objective. CRA policymakers rec
ognized that the credit markets were neither competitive nor di
verse. The CRA is a limited government intervention in the
financial-services market meant to address issues of market failure
and inequity. Requiring that minorities and their communities be
included in the mainstream economy was Congress's way of ensur
ing minimal equality of economic opportunity.8
7. Marcia Johnson, JaPaula Kemp & Anh Nguyen, The Community Reinvestment
Act: Expanding Access, 12 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL'y 89, 89 (2002).
8. See Barr, supra note 5, at 523-24.
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Prohibiting Redlining

When passed by Congress in 1977, the CRA was a direct re
sponse to the specifically identified practice of redlining. 9 Banks
deliberately refused to lend to communities based upon the com
munities' racial makeup. Redlining is the historical practice of liter
ally using a red pen to outline minority neighborhoods. IO Loan
officers were not to make loans to applicants who lived in redlined
areas. Lenders impermissibly used race as a determinant of
creditworthiness without any consideration of financial risk. While
some scholars might define redlining as an illegal practice of dis
criminating based on geographic location, it is inconceivable that
redlining was not race-based. Thus, the CRA is appropriately
viewed as an anti-discrimination statute. As further evidence of the
need to override the discriminatory practice, it is noteworthy that
federal regulations now require that banks have a map available to
visually display the locations of home loans that the banks have
made.1 1
As a response to race-based discrimination, the CRA ad
dressed the disconnect between the services offered by financial in
stitutions and the financial needs of the local communities. The
practice of redlining was blatant. The patterns in minority neigh
borhoods were then, and are now, consistent: an outright refusal to
lend in minority neighborhoods; frequent denial of minority mort
gage applications; policies of making loans only for high-minimum
loan amounts; unusual delays in processing loans; and failure to
give black loan applicants the same advice that is given to white
loan applicants.12 The refusal to look at a borrower's creditworthi
9. See Cassandra J. Havard, Synergy and Friction-The CRA, BHCs, the SBA,
and Community Development Lending, 86 Ky. L.J. 617, 617 n.3 (1997-98) [hereinafter
Havard, Synergy and Friction].
10. See Gary M. Swidler, Note, Making the Community Reinvestment Act Work,
69 N.Y.U. L. REV. 387, 390 (1994).
11. Patterns of residential segregation began in the United States at the behest of
the federal government. The Housing Act of 1934 established the Federal Housing
Authority (FHA) and the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD).
The National Housing Act, Pub. L. No. 73-479, 48 Stat. 1246 (1934) (codified as
amended at 12 U.S.c. § 1701 (2000». HUD, in an initiative designed to develop hous
ing for poor residents of urban areas, was also required by law to identify in each city
specific areas and neighborhoods for different racial groups. There were areas in cities
that were ineligible for federal mortgage lending because of the racial composition of
the neighborhoods. Id.
12. See generally Elizabeth Renuart, Toward One Competitive and Fair Mortgage
Market: Suggested Reforms in A Tale of Three Markets Point in the Right Direction, 82
TEX. L. REV. 421 (2003).
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ness or qualifications was common among private lenders and the
federal government, both of which justified collecting housing and
demographic information in order to avoid areas of high risk. 13
Only with federal intervention through the CRA was the redlining
problem highlighted and then slowly addressed.
B.

Community Disinvestment

Equally offensive as the practice of red lining was the practice
of community disinvestment. 14 Lenders refused to extend credit to
redlined communities, but used the deposits from those communi
ties to extend credit in other neighborhoods. 15 This practice was
contrary to congressional intent, which was arguably to require
banks to reinvest deposits in the communities in which they re
ceived deposits. Thirty years after the passage of the statute, how
ever, the precise definition of "community" remains unclear.
Congress designed the CRA to help address issues of urban
decay and housing deterioration. By accepting deposits from eco
nomically distressed communities and then making loans in com
munities that were more financially more stable, banks were
contributing to the financial decay of economically distressed neigh
borhoods and were perpetuating a vicious cycle. Redlined neigh
borhoods experienced a decline in net worth because there was no
influx of capital. When mortgage loans were offered in redlined
communities, the terms were unusually harsh and oppressive.
Poorly performing loans reinforce the view that a community has
poor collateral and is not creditworthy. The poor performance of
mortgage lending in certain neighborhoods creates unstable home
13. See KENNETH T. JACKSON, CRABGRASS FRONTIER: THE SUBURBANIZATION
OF THE UNITED STATES 198-203; 209-13 (1985). Historical redlining has deep roots in
the federal government. See id. at 197. Congress created the Home Owners' Loan
Corporation (HOLC) during the Depression to help homeowners avoid foreclosure.
See id. at 195-203, 215. In the three-year period following the Depression, HOLC pro
vided new mortgages to one million homeowners across the country at risk of foreclo
sure. [d. at 196. HOLC mapped neighborhoods in particular cities by identifying the
level of security for real estate investments. Id. at 199. These maps graded neighbor
hoods from first to fourth grade and colored fourth grade areas considered "hazard
ous." Id. at 195-209.
14. Craig E. Marcus, Beyond the Boundaries of the Community Reinvestment Act
and the Fair Lending Laws: Developing a Market-Based Framework for Generating
Low- and Moderate-Income Lending, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 710, 728-29 (1996) (distin
guishing community disinvestment from race-based redlining historically and noting
that redlining now refers to both racial discrimination and disinvestment).
15. See Willie Brown, Note, The Forgotten Type of Capital: Addressing the Social
Capital Deficiency in the Inner City, 11 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL'y 527, 550 n.166
(2004).
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ownership rates. A spiraling decline in home ownership continues
as potential new residents are denied the mortgage credit to
purchase homes. The confluence of race and class is evident here,
given that most minority communities, even today, continue to be
areas of disinvestment. 16
C.

Protecting Low- and Moderate-Income Borrowers

In addition to its explicit purposes, the CRA has an implicit
purpose of financial inclusion. It is an income-sensitive piece of leg
islation that protects all borrowers, regardless of race, who reside in
LMI neighborhoods.17 The CRA is intended to help overcome
market failures and discrimination. ls The CRA encourages the de
velopment of lending criteria that would promote individual fair
ness for borrowers and expand credit markets for banks. Implicit
within the notion of fairer financial policies is the expansion of ac
cess to credit and to wealth. In this regard, the CRA is a tool used
to close the wealth gap, providing access to those who are tradition
ally excluded from wealth-making activities and thereby addressing
issues of poverty and deprivation.
The need for individual equality justifies the financial inclusion
component of the eRA. The inability to access mainstream finan
cial products, such as bank accounts and low cost loans, makes ac
cess to credit extremely costly. In turn, the high cost of credit and
use of non-traditional lenders creates a cycle of financial loss and
exclusion that leads to increased financial strain and unmanageable
debt-a reiterative pattern with no visible end.
Banks, as credit-providers, make loans that either create more
barriers or eliminate the ones that exist. Financial exclusion is
often a symptom and cause of poverty. Conversely, financial inclu
sion encompasses the provision of appropriate financial products
and services to groups of vulnerable people. This includes educat
ing borrowers to provide them with the skills, knowledge, and un
derstanding that will allow for better use of products and services.
16. Ted Sickinger, American Dream Denied: When the Door Is Locked To Buying
A Home, KANSAS CITY STAR, Feb. 28, 1999, at AI, available at 1999 WLNR 7447313
(Westlaw).
17. Mae A. Cavoli, Fair Lending Laws: The Growing Tension, 115 BANKING L.J.
604,608-09 (1998) (distinguishing a bank's obligation to offer a variety of low-income
loan products from the obligation to provide loan subsidies for low- and moderate
income borrowers).
18. See Barr, supra note 5, at 519.

THE CRA AND COMMUNITY INCLUSION

2006]

43

The eRA requires that all borrowers, including LMI borrowers,
have access to fairly priced financial products.
Finally, the eRA is, in practice, a financial-inclusion statute. It
requires that lenders engage in responsible lending, with every loan
having an indirect goal of building wealth in traditionally under
served communities. In this regard, the statute should become
more responsive to the environment in which the financial markets
operate. Recognizing that safety and soundness are chief concerns
in any lending decision, the statute must advance to evaluate eRA
compliance in a more qualitative and objective manner. Specifi
cally, eRA must provide LMI borrowers and LMI neighborhoods
protection from practices that steer certain types of credit to certain
borrowers and neighborhoods. Equality of access and equality of
opportunity are best measured in a results-based enforcement re
gime. As argued below, the eRA should do more to ensure that
banks are meeting discernible goals that have been embraced by
the community.
Opponents of the eRA argue that it is really a credit-allocation
statute. 19 They view the eRA's requirement that lending institu
tions meet the credit needs of their LMI communities as overly re
strictive, unnecessary, and inefficient. 20 Opponents also criticize
making credit available on favorable terms to undeserving borrow
ers. Others assert that the eRA promotes geographically restric
tive lending that lacks diversity because it is highly concentrated in
one area,21 and that the eRA actually drives capital out of
communities. 22
An examination of eRA lending records has shown this com
plaint to be unfounded. Recent empirical studies evaluating pre
sent lending activities in LMI and minority communities reveal the
opposite. LMI lending is profitable?3 and racial bias in lending to
LMI and minority communities is still prevalent,24 Thus, the lend
19. See, e.g., Vern McKinley, Community Reinvestment Act: Ensuring Credit Ade
quacy or Enforcing Credit Allocation?, 4 REGULATION 25 (1994), available at http://
www.cato.orglpubs/regulation/regv17n4/vmck4-94.pdf.
20. Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Community Reinvestment Act:
An Economic Analysis, 79 VA. L. REV. 291,295 (1993) (making an efficiency argument
against enforcement of the eRA).
21. [d. at 295, 324.
22. [d. at 296.
23.

[d.

24. African-American, Hispanic, Asian, and Native American homebuyers con
tinue to face unprecedented levels of housing discrimination, geographic steering, lend
ing discrimination, and discrimination in the automatic underwriting process. Giselle R.
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ing practices that the statute aimed to redress now appear in old
and new forms. The new regulation is not an efficient means of
promoting low income lending because "[i]t drives capital away
from poor neighborhoods by imposing a tax on those depository
institutions foolhardy enough to do business In such
communities. "25
II.

MEASURING

eRA

PERFORMANCE

Banks are subject to an annual eRA examination. During that
exam, regulators assess whether the bank is meeting the credit
needs of the community. Regulators use either the performance
based standard or the strategic business plan. The financial institu
tion elects the method of assessment.
A.

The Performance-Based Standard

In 1989, the federal banking agencies amended the eRA's as
sessment criteria. 26 Under the old regulations, banks were obliFinne, Strengthening Mortgage Lending Discrimination Safeguards: The Requisite Need
for Modernizing the Community Reinvestment Act, 7 SCHOLAR 229, 231-32 (2005) (cit
ing ERIN B. GODFREY ET AL., URBAN INST., DISCRIMINATION IN METROPOLITAN
HOUSING MARKETS: NATIONAL RESULTS FROM PHASE 1 HDS 2000 (2002), available at
http://www.huduser.orgipublications/pdUPhasel_Report.pdf). Discriminatory practices
continue that effectively discourage minorities from applying for loans or that grant
loans to minorities "under harsh, adverse loan terms despite creditworthiness." Id.
The federal regulatory agencies responded by adopting a policy statement describing
the general principles the agencies will consider in identifying discriminatory practices
in lending and violations of the FHA and ECOA. Policy Statement on Discrimination
in Lending, 59 Fed. Reg. 18266, 18268 (proposed Apr. 15, 1994).
25. Macey & Miller, supra note 20, at 296.
26. "Under the final rule, a performance-based evaluation system replaces the
twelve assessment factors previously used to evaluate the CRA performance of finan
cial institutions. A large retail bank receives individual scores on three separate tests."
Havard, Synergy and Friction, supra note 9, at 635; see Community Reinvestment Act
Regulations, 12 C.F.R. §§ 25.22(a), 228.22(a), 345.22(a), 563e.22(a) (2006). This evalua
tion focuses on three specific tests that measure lending, investment, and service.
Havard, Synergy and Friction, supra note 9, at 635; 12 c.F.R. §§ 25.21(a)(I),
228.21(a)(I), 345.21(a)(I), 563e.21(a)(I) (2006). Although the categories are deline
ated, "[t]he compliance rating for each test is ... ambiguous, [and] non-numerical."
Havard, Synergy and Friction, supra note 9, at 636. The following excerpt describes the
current evaluation process.
The lending test evaluates the bank's lending performance. Although the
test focuses primarily on direct lending activity, a bank may also request that
the regulatory agency evaluate its indirect lending through its investments in
loan pools, lending consortia, and subsidiaries. The lending test also evaluates
the bank's lending practices to determine whether they are innovative and
flexible.
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gated to ascertain community credit needs and document their
findings to the regulators. Regulators evaluated the banks on how
well they made that assessment. 27 Under current regulations, banks
need only collect information on community credit needs as a part
of their own business plan development.
Under the performance-based assessment, there is an opportu
nity for community groups to comment on a bank's eRA compli
ance. 28 The regulators publish a quarterly list of banks to be
examined for eRA compliance. 29 This publication requirement ap
pears to allow community groups to make their opinions known to
banking regulators during the eRA examination process. 30
While the large retail bank has an option of using the perform
ance test or the strategic business plan, the strategic business plan,
as will be argued below, requires more community involvement in
creating the bank's eRA goals, and is therefore more responsive to
the actual fulfillment of the community's credit needs. 31
B.

The Strategic Plan Option

Banks have some flexibility in complying with the eRA under
the strategic business plan. 32 The optional compliance program al
lows banks more "control and independence in the eRA regulatory
process."33 It also mandates community participation in the forma
tion of a plan. 34
A bank that elects eRA compliance under the strategic busi
ness plan must provide a detailed statement indicating how the
The investment test evaluates whether the bank's lending has resulted in a
benefit to its designated assessment area. After identifying the dollar amount
of the institution's qualified investments, which is independent of the institu
tion's capital, the innovation and complexity of those investments is consid
ered. The qualified investments are then considered in connection with the
community's credit needs and the institution's responsiveness to those needs.
Id. at 635-39 (citations omitted); see also 12 C.F.R. §§ 25.22(d)(3), 228.22(d)(3),
345.22(d)(3),563e.22(d)(3).
27. 12 C.F.R. § 228.7(a) (1997).
28. Havard, Synergy and Friction, supra note 9, at 640-44.
29. 12 C.F.R. §§ 25.45, 228.45, 345.45, 563e.45 (2006).
30. See Richard D. Marsico, The New Community Reinvestment Act Regulations:
An Attempt at Implementing Performance-Based Standards, 49 CONSUMER FIN. L.Q.
REP. 47, 49-50 (1995). See generally 12 C.F.R. §§ 25.45, 228.45, 345.45, 563e.45; Com
munity Reinvestment Act Regulations, 60 Fed. Reg. 22,156, 22,168 (May 4, 1995).
31. Havard, Synergy and Friction, supra note 9, at 639-40.
32. 12 C.F.R. §§ 25.27(c)(1), (f)(l), 228.27(c)(1), (f)(l), 345.27(c)(1), (f)(l),
563e.27(c)(1), (f)(l).
33. Havard, Synergy and Friction, supra note 9, at 640.
34. Id.
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bank plans to meet its CRA obligations. 35 Furthermore, the bank
will be evaluated under the traditional tests for the first year. 36 Af
ter the agency has approved the plan and the plan has been imple
mented successfully, the bank may elect to forego the traditional
CRA tests.
The strategic business plan must be approved by the banking
regulators prior to an examination date.37 The plan must include
specific goals for attaining a "satisfactory" rating. 38 The bank will
receive that rating if it has substantially achieved its goals. Like
wise, a bank cannot obtain an "outstanding" rating unless it in
cludes in its plan specific goals to achieve one. A bank may receive
an "outstanding" rating if it has achieved substantially all of the
goals outlined for an outstanding rating. 39 A bank that fails to meet
its strategic business plan may choose to be evaluated under the
traditional three-part test instead. 40
Choosing the strategic business plan option provides the finan
cial institution with measurable, attainable goals that the institution
itself has developed in complying with the CRA. As an indepen
dently defined plan, the strategic plan directs the regulators' CRA
evaluation to the identified performance goals. Choosing this plan
for CRA compliance gives the institution the advantage of defining
the performance measures that regulators will use in assessment.
A strategic plan may cover a period up to five years and must
include annual, measurable goals. 41 Using this option to fulfill its
CRA obligations, "a bank must [first] conduct informal meetings
with the community [representatives in the designated assessment
area] to identify [and assess the community's] credit needs."42 Sec
ond, the bank must "establish specific, measurable goals."43 Third,
it must "solicit formal comments from the public on the plan"
35. Id. at 639-40.
36. See 12 C.F.R. §§ 25.27(a)(3)-(4), 228.27(a)(3)-(4), 345.27(a)(3)-(4),
563e.27(a)(3)-(4); Community Reinvestment Act Regulations, 60 Fed. Reg. 22,156,
22,168 (May 4, 1995).
37. See 12 c.F.R. §§ 25.27(a), (e), 228.27(a), (e), 345.27(a), (e), 563e.27(a), (e).
38. 12 C.F.R. §§ 25.27(f)(3), 228.27(f)(3), 345.27(f)(3), 563e.27(f)(3).
39. See 12 CF.R. §§ 25.27(f)(3), 228.27(f)(3), 345.27(f)(3), 563e.27(f)(3); Commu
nity Reinvestment Act Regulations, 60 Fed. Reg. at 22,169.
40. 12 CF.R. §§ 25.27(f)(4), 228.27(f)(4), 345.27(f)(4), 563e.27(f)(4).
41. 12 CF.R. §§ 25.27(c)(1), 228.27(c)(1), 345.27(c)(1), 563e.27(c)(1).
42. Havard, Synergy and Friction, supra note 9, at 640 (citing 12 CF.R.
§§ 25.27(d)(1»; see 12 C.F.R. §§ 228.27(d)(1), 345.27(d)(1), 563e.27(d)(1).
43. Havard, Synergy and Friction, supra note 9, at 640 (citing 12 CF.R.
§§ 25.27(c)(1»; see 12 CF.R. §§ 25.27(f)(1), 228.27(f)(1), 345.27(f)(1), 563e.27(f)(1).
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before submitting it to the regulator. 44 Finally, it must receive ap
proval from the banking regulator. 45
The strategic business plan encourages a bank to be innovative
in developing its community lending plans. It also encourages in
volvement on the part of the community that the bank serves. This
optional CRA program gives community participation a settled
place in CRA enforcement. Previously, that participation had been
on the back end-lenders entered into loan commitments to halt
community protests and to obtain regulatory approval of mergers.
Community groups are often seen as opportunists because they are
able to hold up the regulatory approval process if no agreement is
reached between the bank and the community group.46 The strate
gic business plan changes the function and timing of community
participation. The bank would consult community groups to define
its CRA goals before submitting its plan to federal regulators.
Although the CRA business plan gives a bank47 some choice in
the evaluative method used to assess compliance, the examination
still involves a significant amount of discretion on the part of the
examiner. Therefore, approval of the plan does not mean that the
regulatory agency will assess performance in the same way as the
bank proposes. Furthermore, because the plan encourages innova
tion, regulators may unconsciously resist some proposals. Thus,
"[t]he plan's short implementation time frame, mandatory public
disclosure, and lack of specific guidance are all disincentives to in
stitutions from attempting a CRA strategic [business] plan."48
III.

COMMUNITY INCLUSIVENESS AND PARTICIPATION

The CRA recognizes the critical importance of input from un
derserved groups in the community. Thus, their involvement in
44.

Havard, Synergy and Friction, supra note 9, at 640 (citing 12 C.F.R.

§§ 25.27(d)(2)); see 12 C.F.R. §§ 228.27(d)(2), 345.27(d)(2), 563e.27(d)(2). The publica

tion requirement mandates that the notice be put in a "newspaper of general circulation
in each [of its] assessment areas" for a period of at least thirty days. 12 C.F.R.
§ 228.27(d)(2).
45. Havard, Synergy and Friction, supra note 9, at 640 (citing 12 C.F.R.
§§ 25.27(a)(2), 228.27(a)(2)); see 12 C.F.R. §§ 345.27(a)(2), 563e.27(a)(2).
46. See Keith N. Hylton & Vincent D. Rougeau, The Community Reinvestment
Act: Questionable Premises and Perverse Incentives, 18 ANN. REV. BANKING L. 163, 193
(1999).
47. The CRA requires insured depository institutions to comply with the statute's
mandates. The CRA does not apply to non-bank financial institutions. See generally
Baldinucci, supra note 3.
48. Havard, Synergy and Friction, supra note 9, at 640 (citing 12 C.F.R. § 25.27
(1997)).
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evaluating the lending performance of federally regulated financial
institutions has become standard practice. The eRA must avoid
marginalization of communities and their interests. "[T]he objec
tive here [is] to design new [eRA] governance structures that en
able [community groups] to effectively express their perspectives
and represent the interests of these broader communities within the
decision-making processes of [eRA lending]."49
Enforcement of the eRA continues to struggle to get out from
under its past, when the examination process was considered bur
densome and opponents charged that the criteria allowed for im
permissible credit allocation. Long ignored during the examination
process, early eRA enforcement was considered to be arbitrary and
inconsistent. 50 When enforcement of the eRA began, it was, ad
mittedly, ineffective. 51 The legislative goals of prohibiting redlin
ing, promoting reinvestment, and encouraging financial inclusion
were supported only by bank efforts and not by actual enforcement.
Richard D. Marisco notes:
The regulations require the federal banking agencies to consider
the extent of the bank's lending in its community, the geographic
distribution of its loans, and its lending to persons of different
income levels. However, the regulations do not contain objective
and quantitative criteria for measuring bank lending and commu
nity credit needs, or evaluating whether the lending meets credit
needs. Thus, despite the improvement, the regulations fall short
of fulfilling the capital-democratizing promise of the eRA.52

The strategic plan is a more objective measure of eRA per
formance. As a test that establishes quantitative and objective cri
teria, this plan maximizes the statute's potential for serving the
needs of LMI persons. The greatest concern with setting quantifi
able and objective criteria is that such a standard results in credit
allocation or lending quotas. This concern has less potency when
one realizes that the eRA contains neither a private right of en
forcement nor monetary penalties for noncompliance.
49. Elizabeth M. Iglesias, Institutionalizing Economic Justice, 2 U. PA. J. LAB. &
EMP. L. 773,801 (2000) (using this language in discussing union governance structures).
50. See, e.g., Richard D. Marsico, A Guide to Enforcing the Community Reinvest
ment Act, 20 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 165, 269 (1993).
51. Cf. David K. Hales, Reallocating Credit: An Economic Analysis of the New
CRA Regulation, 15 ANN. REV. BANKING L. 571, 588 (1996).
52. Richard D. Marsico, Democratizing Capital: The History, Law, and Reform of
the Community Reinvestment Act, 49 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 717, 723 (2004/2005) [herein
after Marsico, Democratizing Capital].
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Meeting the credit needs of a community requires a fair inter
pretation of the demographics of the community. Under the pre
sent regulations, however, there is a disconnect between lending
and whether it meets the lending needs of the identified commu
nity. Including citizen participation not only democratizes the pro
cess but also begins to challenge the dominant exclusionary
processes. 53 The economic, political, and even cultural environ
ment begins to change whenever those affected by the process have
greater opportunities to modify its outcome.
Recognizing the CRA as a participatory process also lodges it
within the sphere in which it was enacted. It represented an unfin
ished agenda of the civil rights movement. As an interventionist
statute designed to encourage economic equality, the CRA presents
a legal structure that ought to promote access to credit. Any future
course for CRA enforcement must recognize that while there are
competing interests, the most important goal is to produce an insti
tutional arrangement that is genuinely inclusive and participatory.
Undoubtedly, when Congress passed the CRA, there was at
least an implicit recognition that the existing economic and political
power structure was deeply invested in a dominant process that de
nied the material interests and cultural ideologies of a group of peo
ple. Lending was blatantly anti-democratic and exclusionary in the
very structures of internal banking governance. The CRA, along
with other fair-lending laws, was an effort to promote more effec
tive lending given the communities' use of the depository institu
tions. The statute provides a way of monitoring the structures and
procedures of internal governance that affect credit access.
To note, as critical race theorists do, that there are "racial
spaces" is to recognize the law's role in the production of subordi
nation and the relationship between racial discrimination and
class. 54 The confluence of politics and economics has created an
institutional structure that is racially, politically, and economically
unequa1. 55
53. See Alejandro Esteban Camacho, Mustering the Missing Voices: A Collabora
tive Model for Fostering Equality, Community Involvement and Adaptive Planning in
Land Use Decisions, 24 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 269, 307-16 (2005).
54. Racial spaces are geographical areas of economic disinvestment that are also
void of political power. They are born of race-based discrimination. Unlike healthy
economic communities, there is an absence of investment production. It is race-based
discrimination that creates this circumstance. See Richard T. Ford, The Boundaries of
Race: Political Geography in Legal Analysis, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1841, 1847 (1994).
55. See Keith Aoki, Space Invaders: Critical Geography, the "Third World" in
International Law and Critical Race Theory, 45 VILL. L. REV. 913, 949-50 (2000) (citing
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Furthermore, the eRA allows economic exploitation that is
often race-based. The federal banking agencies and other govern
ment entities with jurisdiction over lending discrimination are not
very aggressive in declaring loan products and services non-compli
ant, such as in the case of predatory lending. 56 Procedures should
be much more explicit in identifying and detecting lending discrimi
nation. As an anti-discrimination measure, the eRA should have
evaluative tools that help to eliminate discriminatory lending
practices.57
IV.

STRATEGIC PLANS REQUIRING VERIFIABLE LENDER
PERFORMANCE AND COMMUNITY PARTICIPATION

As a matter of public policy, the future approach of the eRA
requires a balance between the inclusion of all possible require
ments that may enhance community lending, and the avoidance of
changes to the initial requirements. The crucial issue becomes how
to make the eRA more effective in the climate of modernization
and securitization. Requiring the CRA to be more responsive to
changing financial markets is not at odds with this.
A key feature of the strategic plan is the inclusion of commu
nity groups in the creation of the plan. The informal consultation
envisioned by the plan recognizes the inherent benefit that citizen
protests have made to effective CRA enforcement and lender ac
countability. Allowing community groups to participate in the crea
tion of the strategic plan recognizes the need for citizen inclusion in
making a credit democracy.58 It also highlights the effective role
that citizen monitors have played in making the CRA process work.
The citizen-participation component of the strategic plan also
has the advantage of ensuring that community concerns are heard
in advance of the protests that have traditionally accompanied
merger applications. The types of affirmative lending agreements
Elizabeth M. Iglesias, Human Rights in International Economic Law: Locating Latinas/
os in the Linkage Debates, 28 U. MIAMI INfER-AM. L. REV. 361 (1996».
56. See generally Cecil J. Hunt, II, In the Racial Crosshairs: Reconsidering Ra
cially Targeted Predatory Lending Under a New Theory of Economic Hate Crime, 35 U.
ToL. L. REV. 211 (2003) (arguing that the financial exploitation that constitutes preda
tory lending ought to be subject to criminal prosecution).
57. See Cassandra Jones Havard, To Lend or Not to Lend: What the CRA Ought
to Say About Sub-Prime and Predatory Lending, 7 FLA. COASTAL L. REV. 1, 25-27
(2005).
58. See, e.g., Christopher L. Peterson, Truth, Understanding, and High-Cost Con
sumer Credit: The Historical Context of the Truth in Lending Act, 55 FLA. L. REV. 807,
867 (2003) (discussing the costs of using the "fringe" banking system).
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that local citizens' groups negotiate when threatening to stop or de
lay a merger will now become an integral part of the federal regula
tory examination process. Inclusion at this stage of the process also
allows community groups a basis for challenging the accuracy of the
CRA ratings that institutions ultimately receive.
A.

The Participatory Approach and eRA Lending

Community participation in development decision-making is a
widely accepted concept. 59 The dilemma continues to be how to
make mandated participation meaningful and truly inclusive in sub
stantive decision-making areas. Developing a strong participatory
structure requires a commitment to inclusive practices and a will
ingness to alter organizational structures to meet changing commu
nity needs. 60
The justifications for community participation are varied.
Founded on democratic principles that correlate equality with en
gagement, the presumption is that citizens are interested in out
comes that affect them and will therefore make the administration
of the affected program more efficient. The intrinsic value of the
individual, and the potential contributions that come from collabo
ration, also lie at the base of this theory.61 Community participa
tion is premised on notions of government efficiency, citizen
democracy, and, more recently, the notion of empowerment for af
fected communities. 62 Inherent in the theory that includes partici
pant communities in the decision-making process is the notion of
redistribution of power. 63
59. Federal law mandates community participation in other areas, such as devel
opment, land-use planning, and environmental management. In international develop
ment, community participation is commonplace. See Tania Kaiser, Participation or
Consultation? Reflections on a "Beneficiary Based" Evaluation of UNHCR's Pro
gramme for Sierra Leonean and Liberian Refugees in Guinea, in June-July 2000,17 J.
REFUGEE STUD. 185, 186 (2004).
60. Developing and sharing the power base in participatory research requires
striking several delicate power balances-the inter-group dynamics, how to best use the
suppliers of knowledge, and the effective use of the acquired knowledge.
61. See generally Beth Simone Noveck, The Electronic Revolution in Rulemaking,
53 EMORY L.J. 433 (2004) (discussing the participative process and ways to improve
citizen participation).
62. Audrey G. McFarlane, Race, Space, and Place: The Geography of Economic
Development, 36 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 295, 297-98 (1999) (arguing that economic-devel
opment policy must address structural barriers to community participation).
63. See generally Spencer Overton, Restraint and Responsibility: Judicial Review
of Campaign Reform, 61 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 663 (2004) (discussing democratic par
ticipation in the context of campaign financing); Martin H. Redish & Kirk J. Kaludis,
The Right of Expressive Access in First Amendment Theory: Redistributive Values and

52

WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 29:37

Promoting participatory approaches is consistent with both the
process of making loans and the goals of the eRA. To the extent
that eRA lending encourages development in LMI communities,
there must be a process that is both accessible and accountable to
those communities. Participatory approaches, in general, are recog
nized for their effectiveness in allowing communities to identify
their own priorities and influence policy.64
Perhaps the most significant advantage of this approach as it
relates to lending is the access that banks have to "inside expertise"
that, in effect, substitutes for transaction costS.65 The direct experi
ence of living in a community that is underdeveloped in meeting the
service and housing needs of its residents provides essential infor
mation that can help shape lending criteria and decisions. Such an
effective use of the participatory approach marries policy with prac
tice and allows the third-party recipients of the eRA lending-the
members of the community-to have an essential stake in the pro
cess. Thus, as a form of joint inquiry, a participatory approach in
volves those who have both direct and indirect stakes in the
outcome.
Yet another benefit from a participatory approach is that it
provides a basis for monitoring and evaluating the outcome. As
discussed below, the strategic plan option can help reduce the com
plexity of complying with the bank's eRA goals and provide a set
tled guide on the policy interventions needed to achieve them.
B.

Establishing Verifiable Community Lending Needs

To have meaningful community inclusion, there must be a
community definition process and a significant level of community
involvement. 66 The two most important considerations of commu
nity definition are group self-identification and the criteria for in
clusion. Definition of the group should come from the participants
who are able to choose the factors that are significant for inclusion.
the Democratic Dilemma, 93 Nw. U. L. REV. 1083, 1089-90 (1999) (discussing redistrib
utive theory in general).
64. See generally Thomas F. McInerney, Law and Development as Democratic
Practice, 38 VAND. 1. TRANSNAT'L L. 109 (2005) (discussing participatory governance).
65. See Amy C. Bushaw, Small Business Loan Pools: Testing the Waters, 2 1.
SMALL & EMERGING Bus. L. 197, 216 (1998) (explaining that prohibitive costs deter
small businesses from seeking their own investors independently of organized financial
structures such as banks).
66. See Sean T. McAllister, Note, Community-Based Conservation: Restructuring
Institutions to Involve Local Communities in a Meaningful Way, 10 COLO. 1. INT'L
ENVTL. L. & POL'y 195, 202-03 (1999).

2006]

THE CRA AND COMMUNITY INCLUSION

53

Among the criteria for inclusion are spatial and non-spatial inter
ests, and resource identification and dependence. 67 The wider the
interests of the group, the more representative the group can be in
handling the burdens and benefits of the project.
A eRA participatory group should avoid producing a process
that guarantees only procedural fairness. Instead, the community
group must be given significant levels of involvement through the
process. The more vibrant the community group is, the more help
ful it can be in identifying its needs and wants, thereby gaining from
the process. There must be "ownership" of some part of the pro
cess; some part of the decision-making process must be the exclu
sive domain of the community group.
Defining "community" under the eRA when using the strate
gic business plan, therefore, means that the institutional capacity of
the community group is recognized and well-used. Making the
eRA evaluation less subjective and more standardized will accom
plish this goal. Specifically, regulators evaluating lending in the fi
nancial institution's community or defined assessment area must
qualitatively evaluate lending based on volume of deposits, minor
ity population, average income levels, and type of loans. 68 This
type of evaluation requires regulators and the financial institution
to use Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA)69 data in a manner
that requires accountability. It combines the features of the already
recognized strategic plan with the use of HMDA data to allow the
option of the creation of a strategic plan "plus." The effect is for
the institution to have a plan that becomes the focus of the eRA
examination process. It also will require more verifiable lender
performance.
A more stringent strategic plan is needed. A modified strate
gic business plan can concentrate on the lending and investment
tests by making commitments to individual communities and pro
viding more detailed reporting of their lending activities within
specified markets. Financial institutions demarcate their assess
ment areas, which are not necessarily tied to the geographicalloca
tions of the particular banks. The assessment area must be one that
serves LMI persons, small businesses, small farms, or designated
rural areas. 70 This approach is actually an effective way of integrat
67.
68.
ings, 69
69.
70.

Id. at 207.
Community Reinvestment Act-Community Development, Assigned Rat
Fed. Reg. 68,257, 69,260 (Nov. 24, 2004) (codified at 12 C.F.R. § 563e).
12 U.S.c. §§ 2801-2809 (2000).
See Richard D. Marsico, Enforcing the Community Reinvestment Act: An Ad
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ing LMI lending into the bank's mission and is a crucial part of its
business strategy.1 1 The lender follows sound lending policies and
directs capital as identified by community conditions.
Lending and investment would continue to be conducted in
communities that are underserved. Effective use of statistical data
can be useful in closing the access-to-credit gap in these communi
ties. The strategic plan "plus" also puts critical HMDA data to use
in a meaningful way. If financial institutions are required to use
HMDA data, along with input from community groups, as an indi
cator of immediate community needs, the bank's eRA perform
ance can be consistently responsive, rather than responding to
community needs only when a pending merger is challenged.
To avoid the considerable flexibility that is inherent in the stra
tegic plan, regulators will need to provide specific guidance on the
expected measures of performance. 72 By identifying a community
to serve, financial institutions choose to serve low- to moderate
income individuals and small businesses across the United States.
Regulators can verify the eligibility of the identified individuals and
communities. Regulators can also focus upfront on an institution's
compliance with fair-lending statutes and evaluate eRA loans for
credit practices that will harm these communities, such as predatory
lending.
By integrating statistical information, the strategic plan "plus"
will give community groups a means to assess information about
lending to low- to moderate-income and minority borrowers and
neighborhoods, small businesses, small farms, and rural area desig
nations. There is also the added benefit that all of the loans in the
strategic plan "plus" will be examined. In contrast, under the rou
tine geographical assessment, eRA loans made outside of the geo
graphical assessment area are not examined.
The current criticism of the strategic plan approach is that reg
ulators have been slow to approve the plans submitted for review.
The approach is labeled burdensome and inefficient. Because the
strategic plan "plus" allows for lending and investment outside of
vocate's Guide to Making the CRA Work for Communities, 17 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS.
129,141-42 (2000) (citing 12 C.F.R. § 25.22(b)(I)-(5) (2000».
71. See, e.g., Marsico, Democratizing Capital, supra note 52, at 720.
72. See FDIC, COMMUNITY REINVESTMENT ACT: GUIDE TO DEVELOPING THE
STRATEGIC PLAN, ATTACHMENT TO FIL-26-98, at 5 (1993), available at http://www.fdic
.gov/news/news/financiaU1998/fil9826b.pdf (providing general factors, not all of which
would apply to each institution).
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the bank's "community," it is arguably not as effective a reinvest
ment tool as one that ties bank deposits to the community.
C.

Evaluating Verifiable Community Participation

As discussed above, the informal citizen participation required
by the strategic plan brings citizen's groups into the examination
process earlier. Banks should also find it more satisfactory because
it should halt meritless challenges when an institution is seeking ap
proval for a merger, because the institution's goals and objectives
have been pre-defined. Finally, effective inclusion requires some
neutral review of the substantive and procedural aspects of creating
the plan. Criteria to resolve disputes and get issues to the forefront
are crucial.

V.

STRATEGIC OPTION PLAN AS A TYPE OF
PARTICIPATORY ApPROACH

Given the CRA's implicit objective to provide credit access to
LMI borrowers and neighborhoods, it is only equitable to require
discern able goals that are identified and embraced by the expecta
tions of a given underserved community. The CRA, as legislation
rooted in the social history of the 1960s, demonstrates a marked
turn in the direction of most economic and governmental redevel
opment programs by requiring participatory democracy. The
CRA's history has shown a steady progression toward a more active
and, more importantly, strategic participation by those who live and
own businesses in a bank's "community." Implicit, again, within
the statute is the notion that community home and business owners
are stakeholders. The validation of the expertise of local communi
ties in the policy debate allows them to lay claim to the internal
agenda of reinvestment that most often separates their concerns
and issues.
The participatory approach underlies the strategic plan option
of the CRA. It is an approach modeled on democratic principles.?3
Sharing of power in a participatory regime is more than obligatory.
Promoting a more participatory approach requires a different type
of effort. Under the current regime, banks often meet with commu
nity groups to determine the community's needs. However, those
73. The participatory approach is a concept that is well-recognized in develop
ment law and is often used in international law. See generally Pritha Gopalan, The Role
of NGOs: Charity and Empowerment: The Trust Factor in Participation and Social Edu
cation, 554 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & Soc. SCI. 178 (1997).
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banks are not required to view the community as an equal partici
pant. A more defined participatory approach directs the bank to
recognize and highlight community assets and strengths, with com
munity members being seen as equal participants and serving as ca
pable advisors and experts.
It also requires banks to develop a mechanism addressing the
community's needs by determining whether they are providing ef
fective service to disinvested communities. While some of this can
be done by making use of existing community structures, an effec
tive approach requires building and maintaining respecting, trusting
relationships within and across the community. As many are al
ready doing, this approach depends on developing relationships
with opinion leaders in the community.
It is the ability to sustain relationships with community groups
and leaders that is the hallmark of any participatory approach. In
this regard, the challenge is to have banks share, in a meaningful
way, the power structure involved in issues surrounding reinvest
ment. A meaningful participatory approach requires that the com
munity groups understand the local power structure and the issues.
Making banks assume responsibility for the effectiveness of mean
ingful community participation is important to the disempowered in
the community. Effectiveness can be achieved if the bank's clear
status and relationship with the community can command resources
for a long-term commitment.
A participatory approach is most important for the measure of
trust that it imparts between the bank and the community group.
Many complaints based on communication gaps and a failure to re
ceive information can be avoided, thus eliminating the need for
groups to become suspicious as to whether the planned reinvest
ment is in the communities' best interests.
Admittedly, one of the downsides of this approach is that it
may require a bank to make contacts with and develop programs
for more than one community group. Developing increased incen
tives will most likely make for more committed communities in the
long run. Again, it is important to think about how the power is
shared as an incentive to sustained community involvement and
participation.
CONCLUSION

Banks now face the task of balancing community participation
and inclusiveness while at the same time preserving as much auton
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omy as possible in setting eRA obligations. The eRA must adapt
to the changing financial environment and yet remain viable as a
statute that prohibits discrimination, encourages community rein
vestment, and protects LMI borrowers. Predictions from bankers
that the eRA is too risky and unprofitable have not been borne
out. In their stead have been programs that have resulted in inno
vative and profitable lending. Implementation and enforcement of
the statute remain integral goals of securing credit for all economic
segments of our country. But now the advancements must go fur
ther to embrace the statute's implicit and explicit goals and to keep
pace with fast-changing financial products and markets.

